Monday, May 10, 2004

What I’m saying is that these events are the exception and not the rule.'- Iraq the Model

Chaos, A Cruel Scheme or Something Else?

Here's Paul Reynolds musing on how institutional the abuses at Abu Ghraib are. That this did not strike me as dreadful I put down to the reassuring technicality of much of its discussion (but that's the problem). Here's Barbara Amiel with her not reassuring chaos theory.

I start from the premise that the inmates of Abu Ghraib last summer were mostly likely aggressors implicated in murderous activities. I don't think it's possible to treat such vicious people with a lot of dignity without jeopardising the authority of the prison and interrogators. A couple of Iraqi blogs have said some interesting things about this. Iraq and Iraqi's says

'Is there any prison in the world with out humiliation?
Did any one talk about Iraqi human rights before April 2003?
Did any one ask what those people in Abo Ghraib did to be treated like that?
Can any Arab country open its prisons for any committee?
Would any one dare to criticize prisons system in any other Arab country?
'

Iraq the Model has apparently interviewed a source that would lead you to believe that the problem with Abu Graib was that it was too relaxed. It's not inconceivable. If things are too relaxed, then imposing order can sometimes be difficult and messy, and spills over into abuse if subverted.

Reynolds' analysis is titled 'US Policy or Anomaly?'. A key quote is 'Did the guard force at Abu Ghraib who liked to take pictures of themselves at work simply overstep the mark while following a general instruction to set the "conditions for successful exploitation of the internees"?'

As I've mentioned, Reynolds' account is technical. I'm not at all sure it deals fairly with the army report of Maj General Geoffrey Miller's review of Abu Ghraib which was undertaken last summer. I'm especially sceptical about this:

'The words "integration", "synchronisation", "fusion" and the phrase "enabler for interrogation" must mean the process by which the detention officers prepare the prisoners for questioning by subjecting them to demoralising techniques.'

The actual phrase in the report of MG Miller's review was 'intelligence integration, synchronisation and fusion' (italics added). This could mean what Reynolds says it means: the uniting of interrogation techniques with the conditions of detention, but since the detention conditions were never going to produce intelligence directly, it seems to me this could as easily refer to questioning techniques and practices more directly relevant to 'intelligence'. Reynolds seems like he is twisting when he tacks on the phrase 'enabler for interrogation' to the other three words. If we add the two phrases together more naturally, we get 'intelligence integration, synchronisation and fusion' (should act as an) 'enabler for interrogation'. It doesn't make any sense (being the wrong way round) until doctored by Reynolds. Just a thought.

Jed Babbin quotes more from Miller, that 'CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place' when Miller reported last summer. In other words, the privates were doing what they pleased, which seems to have meant a very relaxed regime for the Baathists that were being rounded up and brought to Abu Ghraib.

In fact the headline phrase culled from Miller's review- 'detention operations must act as an enabler for interrogation'- suggests that a basic ethos of detention was being ignored and that senior officers were trying to make it effective. That this failure to enable was at the forefront of MG Miller's mind supports the claims of slackness reported by Iraq the Model. In the case of the abusive minority, their response to accusations of slackness was to abuse prisoners. That is not 'overstepping the mark', it is failing to follow orders.

Reynolds is intent on prolonging the controversy and making the casualties of the Abu Ghraib affair as senior as possible- if they can't get Rumsfeld then let it at least weaken Rumsfeld's personnel- hence the, at bottom, rather obvious attempt to embroil the new director of Abu Ghraib in the controversial incidents of the past.

Update: Samizdata publishes the findings of the military's report into the Abu Ghraib abuses. Here is more info.

Update 2: General Taguba reports to the Senate (linked to this BBC story you can find a pdf copy of his report).

 
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