I Love the Internet

To be specific, one of the things I love is the way bloggers hover like vultures around a story, often pecking with far more vigour than the big media offers, and then suddenly there's a breakthrough and a spectacular finale (you might say, 'the kill'). That seems to have happened with the Joe Wilson affair- and I think Mark Steyn is rapidly acquiring honorary blogger status. There's something of the spirit of blog about him- and this time it's really moving (via Glenn):

'Saddam wanted yellowcake for one reason: to strike at his neighbors in the region, and beyond that at Britain, America and his other enemies. In other words, he wanted the uranium in order to kill you.'

He's never been more tabloid; but I like it.

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Just to make my position on the Butler report clear (and I'm referring, as before, to the Iraq section)- I don't believe what I'm hearing from the vast majority of journalists: Butler did find a great deal he was satisfied with in terms of analysis of intelligence and judgements arising from it. The number of approving remarks Butler makes about key assessments and judgements concerning Saddam, his intentions, threat and capability, suggests strongly he is satisfied with the overall approach. I don't buy the 'devil in the detail' view point, because the details Butler takes issue with are no more significant than the details (the overwhelming number) where he agrees with what was done.

The problem seems to have been that to know exactly what was there and where required the kind of infiltration at high levels that we'd given up hope of when relying on UNscom. After that, without hope of in depth revelations we were dependent on a handful of mid-level contacts, overhead photos, and the rest was guesstimation. The problem was not dodgy contacts, bad analysis, or false conclusions- the problem was our reliance on Unscom and the blindness that resulted when UNscom left in '98 (which is not to say that Butler disapproves of Unscom- he said it had been largely effective in restraining Saddam. As a strategy for dealing with a murderous dictator's WMD ambitions though, 'largely effective' would have been a very worrisome situation- and I think Butler recognises that.)

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Another reason to question our late '90s strategy is outlined in this World Magazine article about Unscam. It's a good summary of where we have got to in the saga- and I think that fears about Saddam's resurgence in the '90s were fuelled by the success he made out of Oil-for-Food - success for himself that is, not the Iraqi people (via Friends of Saddam).